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Abstract. While a growing body of research has examined how organizations respond to 
institutional change, less examined is how institutional change can create opportunities for 
organizations to manage their public image. We propose that institutional change allows firms to 
leverage the ambiguity around the motive for image management and thus minimize audience’s 
unfavorable attribution of the motive. Specifically, we focus on an organization’s name change as 
a means of image management. From the audience’s standpoint, an organization could change its 
name as a result of having responded to institutional change, or to convey new strategic 
directions, or to manipulate the public perception. Institutional change allows a window of 
opportunity when audiences are confronted with the ambiguity over the motive for name change. 
Based on this framework, we predict that firms with poor image are more likely to engage in 
name change during institutional change, and that they are more likely to engage in the type of 
name change that indicates new strategic direction to further benefit from the ambiguity. 
Similarly, we also predict that name changes engaged this way are likely to generate more 
favorable market reactions. We test our framework in the context of the name change by publicly 
listed Chinese firms during the government-mandated corporate governance reform.  
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Institutional change can confront organizations with a new set of rules of the game and 
normative expectations. A growing body of literature has looked at how organizations respond. 
Most of the studies have focused on why and how organizations conform to, resist, or 
symbolically adopt the new institutional framework (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 
2004; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Westphal & Zajac, 2001).Recently, a few studies have started to 
consider how institutional change can create opportunities for entrepreneurship, because the 
established players in the field have been made less legitimate or the new institutional framework 
has enabled more risk-taking behavior (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 
2005). However, whether and how institutional change can create opportunities for organizations 
to manage their public image has not been explored.  
Understanding the link between institutional change and organizations’ image 
management is critical to unveiling the strategic responses by organizations to institutional 
change. As institutional change creates new standards for organizational legitimacy and hence 
constraints over organizational actions, it also gives rise to a window of opportunity in which 
audience have to bear with some ambiguity over the motive and extent of organizational change. 
Such ambiguity can be leveraged by organizations to minimize audiences’ negative attribution 
and to advance their own interests behind audiences’ perception.  
In this study, we focus on organizations’ name change as a key means of image 
management, and propose a framework to understand whether and how organizations can exploit 
institutional change to manage their public image strategically. As an interface between an 
organization and its audience, an organization’s name is a powerful symbol (Pfeffer, 1981) that 
confers identity and myth-like reputational status (Kraatz & Block, 2008), and projects an 
organizational image (Glynn, 2008; Hamilton & Gioia, 2009; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). Name 
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change can be motivated by external reasons, such as the trend of certain names becoming more 
legitimate (Glynn & Abzug, 2002), or internal reasons, such as conveying new strategic 
directions or manipulating audience perceptions (Cooper, Gulen, & Rau, 2005). Audience 
attribute name change to potential causes, and the attribution will affect audience assessment and 
approval of these organizations. Specifically, the attribution of name change to mere obliteration 
of a bad record can hurt an organization’s public image. We suggest that as institutional change 
calls for organizational change, it creates ambiguity in audience’s perception over what is the 
true trigger for name change. Name change that happens in this time window can be motivated 
by organizational change as a result of responding to the new institutional mandate, or by the 
new strategic directions organizations plan to take in addition to responding to the new 
institutional mandate, or by mere impression management, or by a combination of these causes. 
Such ambiguity around the trigger for name change can minimize audience’s unfavorable 
attribution of the motive for change. 
Based on this framework, we argue that firms with a poor public image are most likely to 
leverage the ambiguity created during the institutional change to engage in name change. 
Furthermore, if they engage in the type of name change that substantively indicates new strategic 
directions, they are more likely to maintain the ambiguity around the cause for name change and 
hide their motivation of erasing a bad record from public perception. Accordingly, we also 
predict that name changes undertaken in such circumstances and fashion are likely to generate 
more positive audience reactions.         
The empirical context for our study is the name change by publicly listed Chinese firms 
during the government-mandated corporate governance reform. Prior to 2005, listed firms in 
China had a split structure of corporate governance, partially tradable and partially non-tradable. 
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Non-tradable shares were strictly forbidden to transact on the public market and accounted for a 
majority of 64% of total shares in an average listed firm. In 2005, following the transformation from 
state-socialism to market-capitalism, the central government problematized the existing institutions 
and mandated non-tradable shareholders to convert their shares into tradable shares. This has been 
the most influential financial policy change on China’s stock market. By the end of 2009, 66 batches 
of 1,267 firms in total had completed or at least initiated the adoption of the reform, accounting for 
90% of all firms that were subject to the reform. Among these 1267 firms, 310 firms changed their 
names listed on the stock market immediately after adopting the governance reform and resuming 
trading on the market. By examining what drives name change during the reform and how effective 
different types of name change are in influencing audiences’ perception of the firms, we show that 
firms with poor image are more likely to engage in name change during institutional change, and 
that they are more likely to engage in the type of name change that indicates new strategic 
direction to further benefit from the ambiguity. Similarly, we also show that name changes 
engaged this way are likely to generate more favorable market reactions. 
Our study contributes to research on institutional change and organizational response by 
proposing a framework on how institutional change creates opportunities for strategic 
management of public image. We also contribute to the literature on symbolic management by 
integrating institutional contexts and organizational agency. We highlight that institutional change 
provides the ambiguity around the change rationale for firms so that they can maneuver the 
perceptions and expectations of audiences.  
 
EXPLOITING AMBIGUITY CREATED BY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Firms and key agents are found to deploy meanings, labels, vocabulary (Nigam & Ocasio, 
2010), rhetoric (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), stories (Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011), and 
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verbal impression management (Westphal & Graebner, 2010) to manipulate how external 
audiences assess the image of the firms. Among various narrative constructions and 
organizational symbols, an organizational name is one of the most important means to 
communicate appropriateness and image to external audiences (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).  
Audiences are “collections of agents with an interest in a domain and control over 
material and symbolic resources that affect the success and failure of the claimants in the 
categorical domain” (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). Audiences are critical because they assess the 
viability of an organization’s claim. The more clearly an organization meets the expectations that 
audiences associate with the claim, the more likely an organization is to be judged as positive 
and legitimate (Hannan, Polos, & Carroll, 2007; Hsu, 2006; Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Navis & 
Glynn, 2010; Zuckerman, 1999). When a name change occurs, audiences search for information 
in the external environment and in firm’s internal practice in order to make sense of firm’s 
rationale of name change as well as assessing what the new name attempts to convey.  
However, as human beings, audiences are also somewhat used to a degree of ambiguity 
in understanding the relevance, priority, and coherence in organizational choice (March, 1978, 
1987), how unrealistic acting totally rationally is, and settle for being only semi-intelligent in 
their judgments. If audiences assess firms within a system without complete consciousness of 
their history, the sensible action is to evaluate without complete comprehension of their 
justification. The nature of such bounded rationality simplifies audience assessments of 
organizations and weakens their accuracy because of the difficulties of anticipating or 
considering all alternatives and all information (Lindblom, 1959; March & Simon, 1958).  
Due to the above-mentioned limitation, when audiences evaluate organizations, they 
tolerate the political nature of organizational symbols. As long as the construal of image follows 
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rules of logic, and as long as the firm makes it both understandable and appealing (Kennedy, Lo, 
& Lounsbury, 2011), audiences engage in sense-making to sort, order and assess firms in the 
market with limited suspicion. As a result, firms can separate current reasoning from current 
action when they see a benefit in it, and make good use of such scant regard as a means of 
symbolic management (March, 1978). 
Institutional change can create ambiguity around the motivations for organizations’ name 
change. Organizational theory literature has viewed name change as externally driven by 
cognitive legitimacy that organizations try to resonate with public audiences and institutionalized 
patterns, triggering a conformity of organizational names as a result of symbolic isomorphism 
(Glynn & Abzug, 2002). The finance literature, on the other hand, has viewed name change as 
internally driven and  as a pre-play communication with stakeholders to credibly coordinate 
subsequent business strategies (Cooper, DeJonig, Forsythe, & Ross, 1992; Wu, 2010), such as a 
major corporate and competitive strategy reconfiguration in its corporate/product portfolio (Bosch & 
Hirschey, 1989; Horsky & Swyngeduow, 1987; Karpoff & Rankine, 1994), a change in business 
focus, disposal of subsidiaries, or a major new investment, etc. During a major institutional 
change, a name change can be either internally or externally driven, can embody various purposes 
ranging from isomorphism to strategic repositioning, hence it is ambiguous what the real trigger is 
and what the organization’s rationale is behind the way it changes its name. However, few 
studies have considered that organizations can take advantage of such ambiguity to manage their 
image through organizational symbols.  
We aim to address this gap by showing that organizations are capable of incorporating a 
tolerable level of ambiguity provided by institutional change to invoke audiences’ multiple 
interpretations of a name change as well as favorable attributions and expectations of the firms’ 
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forthcoming activities. In particular, we speculate that if a name change occurs upon an 
institutional change, the purpose of it will be initially associated with complying with cognitive 
legitimacy (Glynn & Abzug, 1998) after the firm’s adoption of the intuitional change. However, 
a name denotes multiple divisions of information about an organization, such as region, industry, 
product, or corporate nature of the firm, etc. A change in any component will trigger audiences’ 
association with a real firm change in the respective area, invoking a desired assumption that 
some essential organizational-level change will be undertaken. Therefore, even a pure symbolic 
act of name change can potentially be interpreted or expected to be an announcement of 
substantive change. As March and Olsen (1983) nicely put it, “After all, politics are important to 
symbols.”  
 
Ambiguity of Change Time  
Firms need flexibility to conjure an envisioned image that promises the audiences what 
ought to be achieved (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Too much precision and articulation of firm 
image do not allow for audiences’ favorable interpretations and aspirational anticipations. A 
recent stream of literature has observed that firms strategically straddle multiple categories to 
dilute audiences’ attention to negative associations (Vergne, 2012) and create ambiguous 
classification scheme that allows organizations to hide behind perceptions of audiences in order 
to protect their own interest (Fleischer, 2009). Therefore organizations are the often suspects of 
invoking favorable reference (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Glynn, 2000) through a claim-making 
process that aims to convey the desired image to the audience with flexibility.  
Ambiguity can be beneficial to organizations’ symbolic management when it allows 
multiple interpretations by audiences (Eisenberg, 1984) and hopefully invokes the favorable ones. 
But audiences do not necessarily interpret firms’ designed images as the firms wish for. In a 
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stable environment, audiences are not so easily “tricked” by firms’ maneuver using ambiguity 
because they naturally follow the standard evaluation procedures and make sure they punish 
those who do not clearly communicate with audiences on the market (Zerubavel, 1996; 
Zuckerman, 2000). On the contrary, in an unstable environment, audiences’ bounded rationality 
grows salient in such way that they become more tolerable with uncertainty and ambiguity 
during their assessment of firms, more open to multiple interpretations and possibilities of firms’ 
choices, and aspire to see firms’ essential change into a better future. Thus, taking advantage of 
an opportunity window of institutional change to maneuver audiences’ perceptions is more likely 
to be successful because audiences are more willing to follow unconventional standards to 
develop their own evaluation standards to compensate for the ambiguity (Fleischer, 2009; 
Padgett & Ansell, 1993). 
Firms are aware of the audiences’ bounded rationality embedded in a web of other claims 
in the contextual environment that demand their attention (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; 
March, 1978). Firms prefer coinciding name change with institutional change to exploit the 
ambiguity of time. When name change occurs upon an institutional change, such as a policy 
shock imposed on firms, audiences tend to associate the name change with the policy because 
such policy shock can shift audiences’ attention from monitoring firms’ ordinary conduct-
performance to evaluating the firms’ response to change and their post-change reconfiguration. 
For instance, during a financial reform, firms may face corporate restructuring, changes in 
controlling shareholders or management, capital reorganizations, share repurchases, etc. If the 
firm changes name, audiences would naturally associate it as a response to the macro-level 
dynamics rather than suspecting the motive of name change. Timing name change together with 
institutional change can also convince audiences that the firm is intent on change because various 
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organizational improvements and new strategies are expected to be undertaken during this period. 
Audiences are already expecting to see substantial improvement from the firm as they assess 
firm’s response to the institutional change.  
If a firm intends to let go audiences’ “bad memories” about the firm, changing name is 
the least costly method of repairing image via communicating with audiences (employees, 
suppliers, financiers, customers, and the stock market) that it has resolved to undertake 
improvements, such as organizational changes, product changes, diversification, etc., even 
without actually launching performance-enhancing mechanisms. However, in seeking to 
interpret name change and their evaluations of the firm, audiences typically ask “Why change 
name and why change now?” If firms were to manipulate audience impressions every time they 
faced performance crisis, it would naturally arouses suspicion—audiences would eventually see 
through the deception after multiple “false alarms” on the market. Hence, the timing of name 
change is important to allay any suspicion about a firm’s real motive for the new image.  
Because of audiences’ tendency of associating name change with institutional change, 
choosing a major institutional rule change as the timing for name change can camouflage firm’s hidden 
agenda when firms intend to conceal their real motives of name change, such as disassociating 
itself from poor performance or bad reputation in the past. Moreover, changing name during an 
institutional change shows the feasibility, credibility and appropriateness of firm’s rebuilding 
image, so that the image of underperformance will fade in the new era. Managers and investment 
analysts frequently claim that name changes convey favorable information about the firm’s 
future performance (Karpoff & Rankine, 1994). In other words, even if the new name per se does 
not capture how performance will improve, the mere act of changing name and the implicit 
promise of future change create a positive impression. Audiences therefore are more likely to 
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anticipate an improvement and look forward to forming a positive opinion of the firm. In this 
way, ‘dishonored’ firms can hide a past that they are not proud of and convince their audience 
that actual improvements are being undertaken. 
Conversely, for firms that have accumulated goodwill in the form of name recognition, 
company image, or out-performing the stock market, the cost of changing name is high because 
the name advantage will be lost (Horsky & Swyngeduow, 1987) and even run the risk of 
anonymity (Kohli & Hemnes, 1995). They are reluctant to risk losing their good name. In other 
words, firms with a troubled past history, such as having low performance or ruined reputations, 
welcome more the opportunity window of institutional change to rebuild image via name change. 
We thus posit that:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with poor public image are more likely to engage in name change 
during the window of opportunity offered by institutional change.  
 
Ambiguity of Change Rationale 
How well a name change can effectively influence audiences’ perceptions depends on 
how the firm changes its name. As the firm changes name, it needs to change one or all divisions 
of labels that denote contents of the firm in its name, such as region, industry, product, or the 
corporate nature of the firm. Audiences appreciate the abundance of information that can be 
accessed for them to make a judgment of a firm. The bigger the change that a new name suggests, 
the more the audiences apply their anticipation of the firm’s future growth in their assessment. A 
name change that embodies future strategic direction change can usually satisfy audiences’ 
demand of information from a name change. In contrary, when a firm changes its name in a way 
that no clear implication of future business change involved or the name change itself is easily 
taken-for-granted, e.g. name change can be easily associated with the broader institutional 
dynamics rather than firm’s individual practice, the new name thus likely frustrates audiences 
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who wants to “know more”. 
Because name change manifest the intended image of the firm, both firms and audiences 
have their preferences for certain image over others. The construal of new image reflecting 
firm’s corresponding new strategic direction needs to be understandable, believable, and 
appealing for audiences to assess firms with confidence. In order to manipulate audiences 
sharing a positive view of the firm, the key is to frame future change and embrace it in the new 
name in aspirational terms (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Feasibility is another crucial factor 
determining whether a name change is effective. Audiences need to believe in firms’ capabilities 
of realizing their desired objectives. Therefore the “brighter future” suggested by the new name 
has to be logical and plausible. 
Name change that suggests greater opportunity of growth is usually favorable by 
audiences (Karpoff & Rankine, 1994). Some firms also choose to reflect a changed business 
strategy in the new name, implying that the firm’s switching to another industry or product to 
focus, that the name is no longer as closely associated with the firm’s previous line of business, 
and that the firm is pursuing, or plans to pursue, business operations that are better described by 
the new name than the old. However, some names themselves possess no such intrinsic value, 
but that the act of name change itself announces a departure from the past. Firms thus use such 
ambiguity of change rationale to make audiences believe that a new name is based on careful 
screening to ensure that it is consistent with firm’s intended strategic direction and image but, 
instead, they are simply assessing firms based the cosmetic act of name change. 
The effectiveness of the ambiguity of change rationale is enhanced by the ambiguity of 
change time. As audiences shift their attention to digging out layers of meaning in a name 
change, they delve their minds in interpreting name change as a firm’s attempt to accurately match its 
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image or identity to its current resolution. However, in the process audiences are likely to fail to 
perceive that even when name change coincides with a real organizational change due to the 
field-level dynamics, it may still just be a symbolic action for a different agenda, designed to 
capitalize on the ambiguity of change time. Perceptions and assessment on “made-believe” 
changes are self-enforced by audiences due to their tolerance of ambiguity in their judgment. 
Firms, on the other hand, are somewhat intelligent in exploiting the ambiguity to maneuver 
audiences’ perceptions.  
 
Setting: China’s Split-Share Structure Reform 
Prior to 2005, listed firms in China had a split structure of corporate governance, partially 
tradable and partially non-tradable. The governance structure of a typical Chinese listed firm consists 
of three major categories of ownership (Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 2000): (1) state shares owned by the 
central or provincial governments; (2) legal person shares owned by a mix of various domestic 
institutions comprising private companies, non-bank financial institutions and partially-privatized 
SOEs; (3) publicly tradable shares that are widely distributed and free to trade on stock exchanges, 
owned by individual investors as well as private institutional investors. Some firms also have foreign 
shares in the structure. State shares and legal person shares comprised non-tradable shares. Up to 
2004, they were strictly forbidden to transact on the public market and accounted for a majority of 
64% of total shares in an average listed firm. In 2005, following the transformation from state-
socialism to market-capitalism, the central government problematized the existing institutions and 
mandated non-tradable shareholders to convert their shares into tradable shares. This has been the 
most influential financial policy on China’s stock market. By the end of 2009, 66 batches of 1,267 
firms in total had completed or at least initiated the adoption of the reform, accounting for 90% of all 
firms that were subject to the reform. Among these 1267 firms, 310 firms changed their names on the 
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stock market immediately upon their adoption of the governance reform after they resumed trading 
on the market.  
Each stock name of listed firms on China’s stock market is composed of categories or 
divisions with maximum four Chinese characters that denote their contents. Every one or two 
characters denote information on one aspect of the firm, such as region, industry, product, or 
corporate nature of the firm. Traditionally, a firm chooses two or three aspects of the firm to 
include in its stock name in order to identify itself on the stock market.  For example, the stock 
name “上海汽车” means “Shanghai Automobile”, whereas “上海” means “Shanghai” and “汽
车” means “Automobile”, indicating both the region and industry that the firm operates in. 
Having a combination of region and industry is a common choice of stock name. Some firms 
have the name of its holding company as a unique identifier to combine with either region or 
industry. Based on the criteria of abundance of information on change, feasibility of change, and 
taken-for-grantedness of change, we distinguish 3 groups of name change and evaluate the 
effectiveness of each one. 
Change in Region (Drop Region). Corporations often include their geographical region 
in the name even though they have already expanded their operations to other areas over time. In 
a market that is becoming increasingly global, a regional image may be restrictive for conveying 
a promise of growing market share on a national or even a global scale (Kohli & Hemnes, 1995). 
Shedding a regional image to show firm’s determination of expanding geographically by 
dropping the region component of a name seems to be a logical choice. Observing the firm from 
a comfortable level of ambiguity about its motive for changing name, dropping region is quite 
sufficient information for audiences to presume that the firm feels burdened by the narrow 
association with its region as it becomes a national or global player. Such an assumption implies 
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better growth opportunities and a brighter future for the firm, even without knowing the firm’s 
exact plan. Therefore, dropping region is likely to be considered as reflecting an actual 
organizational change.  
Change in industry or product (Drop/Add). Some firms indicated the prominent industry 
in which the firms engage their business in their names. Some firms included the brand names of 
their most well-known products as their stock names. As firms expand their business to other 
related products, or diversify into unrelated products, a name that includes precise descriptions of 
product or industry becomes misleading, and most importantly, too narrowly-focused. 
Particularly under environment change, firms can be expected to break away from identities that 
constrain them, and incorporate images that offer more flexibility, if association with a particular 
product or industry does not fit well with the trend in market expectations. We therefore observe 
firms opting to drop the branded product name from their stock names, or drop the industry 
sector that the firm operates in. In this way they deliberately disassociate themselves from one 
particular product or business in favor of a broader focus. Conversely, some firms adopt names 
of a branded product or its most prominent industry sector to strengthen their position in a 
particular field. To some extent it shows confidence in the prospect of profitability in the 
specified product or industry area. Either dropping or adding a firm’s distinctive product or 
industry in its name predicts a strategic reconfiguration. The presumed rationale of name change 
in this way appears logical, understandable and feasible to audiences, who will anticipate real 
firm-level changes even if the firm ultimately does not implement the expected reconfiguration.  
Change in Holding Company Title (Drop/Add/Change). Some firms made name change 
in the component of its holding company title. In our research context, all name changes are 
made upon the adoption of a corporate governance reform. Thus, making change of the holding 
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company component to the stock name seems to be an obvious approach of name change with 
respect to governance change. Compared with the other two types of name change, change in 
holding company does not clearly imply what the firm is becoming by its strategic effort. The 
message embodied by such name change—tighter/looser/shift in control by the holding company 
is likely to be taken-for-granted by audiences, or even frustrate audiences by failing to disclose 
no further information about the future business plan.  
Both changes in region and changes in product/industry hold out a promise of 
organizational effort to improve the current business, although the name does not reveal firms’ 
concrete plans. Nevertheless, such promise gives audiences hope for a brighter future, thanks to a 
combination of ambiguity and indefinite possibility. As Gioia and Thomas suggested (1996), 
formulating a compelling future image that allows audiences to associate with can ease the effort 
of firms to justify their commitment to the change. Change in the holding company name, on the 
other hand, generates only taken-for-grantedness and less appreciation of firms’ potential 
improvement. Eventually, audiences prefer information that provides more flexibility and 
positive possibility than information they were already expecting.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with poor public image are more likely to engage in substantive 
name change indicating new strategic directions (change in region and change in 
product/industry in this context) during the window of opportunity offered by 
institutional change.  
 
Market Reactions towards Name Change 
Previous studies suggest that a name change may signal information to a major audience 
on the stock market, i.e., investors, (Bosch & Hirschey, 1989; Horsky & Swyngeduow, 1987; 
Howe, 1982) but provide mixed findings on how much value name change yields. Some have 
shown that increased stock price (Cooper, Dimitrov, & Rau, 2001; Marcial, 1991; Smith, 1987), 
abnormal financial performances (Argenti, Hansen, & Neslin, 1988; Bosch & Hirschey, 1989; Horsky 
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& Swyngeduow, 1987) and significant organizational upheaval (Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, & 
Rau, 2005; Wu, 2010) on the stock market often follow a name change. Responses to open-ended 
questions in a study by Manning and his colleagues (2005) suggest that many analysts read 
information into the company’s choice of name. The notion that a company’s name affects its 
price-earnings ratio is widely accepted among investment analysts (Karpoff & Rankine, 1994; 
Manning, Selvage, & Lee (New York, 1985). However, contrary to the popular opinion that 
corporate name changes have a significant effect on valuation, some studies have documented a 
failure to affect short-term stock performance; anecdotal evidence of a positive average stock 
price reaction to name changes around the announcement date turns out to be modest and 
transitory (Bosch & Hirschey, 1989), short-term (Kot, 2011), and sensitive to sample selection 
(Karpoff & Rankine, 1994). Evidence has been found of negative abnormal returns in the 
Australian capital market on the days corporations announced name changes (Josev, Chan, & 
Faff, 2004), and of a decline in trading volume accompanied by a significant decline in abnormal 
returns on the day of a voluntary change in ticker symbol (Kadapakkam & Misra, 2007). These 
mixed results suggest that corporate name change may serve a purpose but have only small 
short-term valuation effects or tend to be anticipated by investors (Kot, 2011).  
In contrast to the rash of studies on short-term stock market returns towards name 
change, few long-term market reaction studies have been conducted. Wu’s (2010) study on name 
changes on the U.S. market suggested that radical name changes prompt negative stock 
responses over longer horizons, but name changes tied to refocusing the scope of business can 
have positive peer-matched, adjusted excess returns in the long run. Kot’s (2011) study on name 
changes among Hong Kong listed firms showed very weak evidence of a relationship between 
long-run abnormal stock returns and corporate name changes. Andrikopoulos and his colleagues 
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(2008) found that on average the long-term performance of renamed firms underperformed the 
market, based on a study of the U.K. market.  
Theoretical explanations of the above mixed findings on market reactions towards name 
change center on the debate on whether a firm’s subsequent economic performance is tied to 
changes in direction that the type of name change foreshadows (Wu, 2010), or whether cues 
about operating in a different line of business conveyed by the name change do not influence 
how investors treat the firm at all (Karpoff & Rankine, 1994). Simply put, the existing empirical 
evidence casts doubt on whether name change conveys the intended information to the market 
and whether audiences such as investors and stock analysts ‘buy’ the signal of name change. 
Based on the theory of exploiting ambiguity and our analysis on the three types of name 
change in the given context, we posit that during an environmental shock firms take advantage of 
audiences’ assumptions that real change will be undertaken in order to improve their perceptions 
of the firms. The effectiveness of such opportunistic identity management via name change will 
depend on whether the strategic direction that the new name attempts to communicate is 
perceived to promise a bright future. When it does, even if there is no actual firm-level change to 
strengthen performance, we speculate that the firm may still be rewarded for saying “what 
audiences want to hear” via the new name. Despite the mixed findings in literature on market 
response to name change, we predict the market reaction towards different types of name change 
in this context will exhibit the following patterns: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with poor public image that engage in name change during 
institutional change are likely to generate better market reaction, compared with 
otherwise.  
  
Hypothesis 4: Firms with poor public image that engage in substantive name change 
during institutional change are likely to generate better market reaction, compared with 
otherwise.   
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The effect of name changers could also experience an increasing market evaluation over 
the long run. Over time, audiences gradually forget their initial worries about the uncertainty of 
name change and pay more attention to asking what kind of future the firms can expect (from 
reading the new name). As a result, a firm’s name change strategy becomes more effective and 
the bright future it intends to portray begins to influence audiences after a certain period of time. 
We therefore examine both the immediate market reaction and the long-term market reaction. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data 
We tested our hypotheses among 1267 listed firms on China’s domestic stock market 
exchange that had adopted a corporate governance reform—the split-share structure reform—of 
which a quarter had changed their stock names upon adoption. The China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and WIND database constitute our main sources of data. 
The CSMAR database is developed by Guo Tai An Technology Company (GTA), a Hong Kong-
based firm that cooperates with University of Hong Kong and the China Accounting and Finance 
Research Center of Hong Kong Polytechnic University to meet the needs for economic analysis in 
China. The CSMAR database covers ownership structure and financial performances of all listed 
firms in China since 1992, including daily stock prices and returns. The data format of CSMAR 
resembles the CRSP and Compustat databases. It has been widely used in finance (Li, Moshirian, 
Nguyen, & Tan, 2007; Lin & Su, 2008) and economics research (Rousseau & Xiao, 2008). Our data 
on China’s split-share structure reform and name change come from the WIND database, produced 
by a Shanghai-based leading data and financial software vendor from mainland China. It has been 
widely used by investment banks in China and Chinese scholars doing firm-level research. WIND 
provides detailed information on firms’ split-share structure reform adoption, including the 
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announcement date of reform, whether and how the firm changed stock name after the reform, and 
the date of the firm resuming on the stock market, etc. In addition, it also provides information on 
whether firms have committed frauds and the disclosure dates. 
 
Method for Examining the Likelihood of Name Change 
Estimation method and dependent variable. We obtained 1,267 firms that had adopted the 
split-share structure reform and were subject to name change between 2005 and 2009. Among them, 
310 firms changed their names on the stock market right after they resumed trading on the stock 
market. To examine what drove such name change, we merged the WIND database on name change 
adoption with WIND database on financial fraud, and one-year lagged CSMAR fiscal year-end 
performance data. We used the binary outcome Logit model to analyze the likelihood of name 
change. Naturally, we coded a firm’s choice of name change as 1, no name change as 0.  
Independent variables. Both organizational theorists (Greve, 1998) and economists (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982) assume that poor performance stimulates organizational change. Under Hypothesis 
1a, firms are more likely to exploit the new governance policy opportunity to change names if their 
past performance was unsatisfactory. We included two one-year lagged performance measures, return 
on asset (ROA) and Tobin’s q to test the hypothesis. We selected the most frequently used measure 
ROA as the performance measure since it has been widely used as a performance proxy that can be 
compared across industries (Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Chen, 1994). Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio 
of market value to the replacement cost of the firm. It has been widely used as performance measure 
in industrial organization research (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988) 
because of its attractive properties in minimizing industry-related biases, such as systematic risk, 
disequilibria, tax laws and accounting conventions, factors that tend to vary more across industries 
than within them. In addition, it provides a more subtle equity market evaluation since our argument 
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emphasizes on how low performance on the stock market motivates firms to change names.  
Under Hypothesis 1b, previous disclosed frauds lead to a higher likelihood of name change 
because firms that are publicly known to have committed fraud have a higher incentive to rebuild 
their reputation. We coded 3 types of disclosed frauds based on the classification in the WIND 
database and set 3 dummy variables for each type of fraud: (1) false financial disclosure in recent 
two years; (2) significant delay of financial disclosure in recent two years; (3) irresponsibility in 
disclosure process in the recent two years.  
Control variables. We controlled for the age of a listed firm since its founding to account for 
how long the firm has been operating on the stock market. A firm’s size can also significantly 
influence name change decision because names of big firms are usually well-established and well-
known among audiences such as investors and consumers, making them potentially reluctant to 
abandon their renown. We took the log of a firm’s total asset to control for the impact of firm size on 
name change. We also controlled for industry effects by including all 22 industry dummies and 
region effects by including all 31 province dummies.  
Every Chinese listed firm with state shares reports to the respective controlling state agency 
across national, provincial and local hierarchical levels. For each level of authority, a collective of 
specialized government economic agencies, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commissions (SASACs), assert the legitimate right of the state’s shareholding in the firms. An 
association with different state hierarchies may influence a firm’s decision on name change due to 
differences in the liberty to change a well-established name. For instance, firms that are associated 
with the central government and the central SASAC often belong to crucial industries that are subject 
to national operation. It would be difficult or even unrealistic for them to actually change their image 
on the stock market. In contrast, some listed firms have no direct state control and are least formally 
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connected to the state, so enjoy more freedom to send symbolic signals to the market, or simply 
indulge in more impression management compared with their government-related peers due to 
relatively less state support. We generated three dummy variables to indicate to which hierarchical 
level does firms report to: (1) Center, firms that are supervised by the central government, central 
SASAC and central SOEs; (2) Provincial, firms supervised by provincial and local governments, 
provincial and local SASACs, and provincial and local SOEs; (3) Individual, firms that have no 
state-related supervising agency but only report to shareholders such as private funds, individual 
investors, foreign firms, and universities. We included Provincial and Individual as controls in all 
logit models in the analysis.  
We took into account the impact of firm’s crucial agents on name change—the president of 
the board and the CEO. The decision to initiate an identity reshaping on the stock market can be 
influenced by the change dynamics in the upper echelons (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), especially the succession of the president of the board and 
the CEO since key agents are often the locomotives to push impression management (Westphal & 
Graebner, 2010). We included one dummy variable Change of head incorporating a firm’s change of 
CEO or a change of president of the board in the previous year. We also included the ratio of a firm’s 
board’s shareholding as a control variable.  
We added the number of M&As in the past year (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) to control 
for how likely firms are to engage in name change due to actual firm-level scope change. We also 
included the diversification level of a firm by calculating how many diverse industries a firm engages 
in and a dummy indicating whether there has been a change in a firm’s diversification level in the 
previous year. In addition, according to theory on herd behavior, firms tend to mimetically adopt a 
practice if others have adopted it. They believe that the decisions of others are rational so that their 
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adoptions infer positive information about the practice (Greve, 1996). We therefore included the 
number of name changes during the reform period by peer firms prior to the focal firm’s decision on 
name change.  
We posit that, even facing an external policy shock, name change is still likely to be driven 
by poor reputational history such as low performance or disclosed fraud. To rule out the impact of a 
firm’s governance change in response to the reform policy on the likelihood of name change, we 
controlled for how many non-tradable shares a firm needs to convert during the reform to take into 
account the magnitude of influence of the policy change. In addition, during the reform, two major 
categories of compensation method paid to tradable shareholders were employed: (1) the standard 
plan, the most frequently used compensation method in the reform, whereby non-tradable 
shareholders issued a negotiated ratio of bonus shares to compensate tradable shareholders. This 
method was transparent, suggested by the CSRC, and regarded as the most legitimate form of 
implementation during the reform process. (2) A set of alternative decoupled methods comprised the 
tailored plan that involved internal asset and debt configuration to compensate tradable shareholders, 
such as offering call or put warrants, guaranteeing stock buy-backs at pre-set prices, cancelling a 
fraction of non-tradable shares, paying cash, transferring assets and writing-off debts, etc. This 
method was less transparent, adjusted by individual firms, and subject to firms’ financial and 
operational conditions as long as it did not deviate too far from the guidelines. We took into account 
the decoupling effect on the likelihood of name change since firms adopting the tailored plan may 
have had a bigger incentive to change name. If our argument that a firm tends to exploit the 
opportunity of an external shock to reshape identity in order to erase its audiences’ bad memories 
holds, the impacts of the volume of non-tradable shares and the decoupling behavior on the 
likelihood of name change should be very weak.  
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Methods for Examining Market Reactions towards Name Change 
Independent Variables. We classified name changes into 3 categories and coded them into 
dummy variables: dropping region (delete the regional origin of the firm in its stock name), 
Change in industry/product (e.g., drop or adopt its well-recognized branded products or its 
prominent industry), and Change in holding company (add or drop the name of the mother 
holding company to firm’s stock name). The baseline group opposing to these 3 groups of name 
change firms in our analysis is firms that have not opted to change their names during their adoption 
of the reform. To estimate the market reaction towards name change, both short-term and long-term 
market reaction are measured by continuous dependent variables, therefore ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) is appropriate in both cases.  
Short-term reaction. To test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 predicting relationships 
between name change and immediate market reaction, we used standard event study methods. 
Our events of interest were name changes on the stock market when firms resumed trading after 
their adoption of the split-share structure reform. We computed the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) in different time windows around the time of name change and assessed differences in 
market reaction across different types of name change. A differential market reaction would 
constitute evidence that the market anticipates a different future performance from firms 
depending on how they change names. CARs for each firm i in the event window [𝑡1, 𝑡2] around 
name change announcement q are calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑞(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =∑(
𝑡2
𝑡1
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡) 
Long-term reaction. To test Hypothesis 3 comparing the long-term market reaction with the 
immediate market returns, we chose to examine the increasing/decreasing trend of a firm’s Tobin’s q 
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after name change to capture the long-term market reaction towards name change. To isolate the 
causal effect of the independent variable—different types of name change, we created instrumental 
variables with a two-stage least square regression. The first stage of the model regressed different 
types of name change on three exogenous variables. We selected 3 exogenous variables as 
ourinstruments: (1) the ratio of shareholding by the board; (2) the ownership concentration of the 
focal firm; and (3) the number of name changes by other firms during the reform adoption prior to 
the focal firm. In the second stage of the regression, the endogenous variables, different types of 
name change, were replaced with predicted values produced from the first stage regression, which 
produced consistent and unbiased regression estimates. To assess the fitness of these 3 exogenous 
variables as out instruments, we conducted 2 post-estimation tests to rule out the possibility of weak 
instruments and over-identification. The F-statistic for the joint significance of the 3 instruments in 
the first-stage regression was statistically significant across all name change types, which allowed me 
to reject the null hypothesis that these are weak instruments. In addition, Wooldridge’s score test of 
over-identifying restrictions was not statistically significant, which indicated that our instruments 
were uncorrelated with the structural error term. We therefore assumed that the exogenous variables 
were adequate instruments.  
 
RESULT 
Likelihood of Name Change 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the Logit model of determinants of name change 
analysis in a sample of 1267 firms are shown in Table 1. Overall the table does not suggest any 
significant data problems.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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The specification of the model examined the differing likelihood of name change upon the 
governance reform depending on a firm’s past performance and disclosed fraud. We entered 
controlled covariates, ROA, Tobin’s q, and 3 types of disclosed fraud step by step in 4 different 
models to examine their impacts. Results are presented in Table 2. Model 1 includes only the control 
variables. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Using Model 2 and Model 3, we tested our prediction in Hypothesis 1. In Model 2, the 
negative sign of the coefficient of ROA supports this hypothesis with marginal significance. In 
Model 3, we added Tobin’s q in the model. As we predicted, the negative sign of the coefficient gives 
support to hypothesis 1 that the lower the performance on the stock market, the less growth 
opportunity of the firm perceived by the market reflected by Tobin’s q here, the more likely it is for 
the firm to change its name. We proceeded to test the impact of disclosed fraud in the recent past. In 
Model 4, we entered 3 dummy variables indicating 3 different types of fraud disclosed. The results 
show that false financial disclosure and significant delay in financial disclosure in the last 2 years 
do not significantly increase the likelihood of name change. However, when firms have been 
accused of being irresponsible in their disclosure process in the past 2 years, they are more likely 
to change names. Hypothesis 1b is partially supported. The difference between the first two fraud 
types and the third one is that the first two both clearly state that the firm has committed frauds 
in its financial reporting, whereas the third one is relatively vague in terms of what the firm has 
done. Thus, we speculate that changing name on the stock market after the first two fraud types 
reveals too much of the firm’s real purpose and name change would become less of a wise 
symbolic management tactic. In contrast, the third type fraud still allows firms to amend their 
image through name change since audiences have not yet formed a strong impression of them 
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being responsible for financial misconduct. Combining the results in Model 2, Model 3, and Model 
4, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
The effects of control variables remain similar across all the models in Table 2. Both age and 
size influence the likelihood of name change. Firms that do not officially report to the government 
are more likely to engage in name change as we predicted. The change of CEO or president of the 
board has no influence. Instead, the ratio of board members’ shareholding of the firm has a 
significantly negative impact on name change decision. Firms are more likely to change name if 
there have been M&As in the previous year that altered the corporate portfolio. The negative impact 
of the number of name changes by peer firms prior to the focal firm suggests that instead of herding, 
a ‘snob’ effect is possibly taking place whereby organizations do not want to look like others in 
their environment (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). As predicted, the amount of non-tradable 
shares that the firm needs to convert during the reform and whether the firm has adopted a 
decoupling approach to implement the reform have no influence on the likelihood of a firm’s use 
of name change, reinforcing our theoretical argument that firms exploit the policy shock as an 
opportunity for symbolic management instead of being driven by it.  
 
Short-term Market Reaction: Event Study using Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Given that low performance and the disclosure of fraud have been found to make name 
change more likely, one issue to address before examining market reaction towards different name 
change strategies is that of whether firms’ previous underperformance and/or fraud leads to them 
choosing a certain type of name change method, and thereby influence the market reaction towards 
that particular name change strategy—in other words, whether it is a firm’s prior condition or its 
choice of name change strategy that influence the subsequent market reaction. We did a cross-
tabulation of performance and fraud conditions prior to firms’ choice of name change and found no 
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such pattern, as shown in Table 3. Therefore hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
In the event study, we computed and tested cumulative abnormal returns to firms adopting 
the governance reform for several alternative event windows to allow for information leakage prior 
to the announcement of name change and for post-event adjustment periods of various lengths. Table 
4 presents the results of the event study analyses and the tests of Hypothesis 3. We controlled for the 
similar covariates as we did in the previous models. The baseline comparison group across columns 
is firms with no name change during their adoptions of the reform. The results are presented as % 
cumulative abnormal returns in the respective event window with day=0 set on the date of listed firm 
resuming trading on the stock market with new name announcement.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
We find a negative but statistically significant market reaction to the name change 
announcement for the sample of firms adopting the reform as a whole, shown in Table 4 Column 1. 
The name change firms thus realize about -1.8% (ranging from 1.43% to 2.12%) negative returns 
around the announcement date comparing with firms with no name change. Hypothesis 3 in terms of 
short-term market reaction is not supported. One plausible explanation of why market does not 
react positively immediately is that even the most insensitive audiences can detect the risk of 
trusting a name-changed firm on the stock market given the reason for name change is not fully 
understood, and the future after the name change is even harder to predict. Therefore audiences’ 
initial response to name change will be less optimistic. 
Results in our tests also show that significant differences exist in the market reaction to name 
changes and these differences are associated with the choice of name change strategy. In the days 
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immediately surrounding the name change announcement, firms having change in holding 
companies to their new names  (Table 4, Column 4) realize significant negative returns of -2.47% in 
the [-1; 3] event window. Firms dropping region (Table 4, Column 2) and changing industry/product 
(Table 4, Column 3) also realize negative returns of  0.1% in the [-1; 3] event window, but not 
significantly.  
We tested the sensitivity of our findings to alternative event window definitions. Some 
information leakage might occur prior to the name change announcement. Thus we also examined 
event windows spanning the few days prior to the announcement, but found no significant leakage 
effects. Table 4 presents CARs for [-1; 3], [-10; 1], [-3; 3], and [-5; 5] event windows. The CARs in 
these alternative event windows do not differ significantly. To allow for a longer window for new 
name disclosure, we extended the event study tests to one and two weeks (5 and 10 days) post-
announcement. Table 4 presents [-1; 5], [-1; 10], and [-5; 5] event window CARs. All are consistent 
with the findings we observe in other event windows. Across all windows, we find significantly more 
negative market reaction to changing holding company than to dropping region and changing 
industry/product, supporting Hypothesis 4 in terms of short-term market reaction.   
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Long-term Market Reaction: Instrumented Ordinary Least Squares Regression  
Figure 1 presents the plotted means of cumulative abnormal returns to our sampled firms 
starting from the announcement date of name change until 365 days later (1-year hold).  Figure 2 
presents the plotted means of cumulative abnormal returns to firms across three types of name 
change. From the graphs, we observe that within a year the cumulative abnormal returns to firms that 
opted to change names take off and eventually exceed those that did not change names. Among name 
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change strategies, dropping region yields the highest long-term accumulative abnormal returns; 
dropping/adding product/industry follows, and adding holding company comes last.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
We used instrumented OLS regressions to examine the impact of different types of name 
change on the increasing/decreasing trend of a firm’s Tobin’s q to capture the long-term market 
reaction. If a firm changes its name in year t, we independently regressed different types of name 
change on Tobin’s qt − Tobin
′s qt−1 , Tobin’s qt+1 − Tobin
′s qt , and Tobin’s qt+2 − Tobin
′s qt+1 . 
Table 5 shows all the second-stage instrumented regression results on the above three dependent 
variables. The controls presented in Table 5 across 4 columns are generated from regressions on 
Tobin’s qt − Tobin
′s qt−1 . The results for controls in regressions on the other two dependent 
variables do not change significantly. We therefore exclude them from the table and show only 
the regression outcomes of different name change types on the alternative dependent variables 
Tobin’s qt+1 − Tobin
′s qt  and Tobin’s qt+2 − Tobin
′s qt+1 for easy comparison of the trend of 
market evaluation towards name change. As predicted, the Tobin’s q tends to go up in the following 
2 years for firms that have changed their names (Table 5, Column 1), supporting Hypothesis 3. In 
particular, dropping location (Table 5, Column 2) and dropping/adding product/industry (Table 5, 
Column 3) generate increasing Tobin’s q, indicating positive long-term market reaction, supporting 
Hypothesis 4. Not surprisingly, adding holding company (Table 5, Column 4) does not significantly 
improve market’s evaluation of the firm, even after a longer period of time.  
An alternative explanation for the increasing market evaluation towards name change: 
firms with name change may have actually implemented the strategic change promised by their 
new names and improved their performance. In order to rule out this explanation, our analysis 
examined the association between firm’s name change and its actual performance over a long 
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time span. We followed similar steps as in the analysis of Tobin’s q, and replaced Tobin’s q with 
ROA. Table 6 shows the long-term shift in firm performance after name change. From the results 
across 4 columns, we observe that ROA, which we employed to proximate a firm’s actual 
performance, does not increase over the long-run after name change, even though the market 
evaluation of the firm significantly increases. The results provide a robustness check for Hypothesis 
3: the market reacts favorably towards name change after a longer period of time, even when there is 
no actual performance improvement.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we propose that institutional change allows firms to leverage the ambiguity 
around the trigger for image management and thus minimize audience’s unfavorable attribution 
of the trigger. Specifically, we focus on an organization’s name change as a means of image 
management. We test our argument in an empirical setting, among 1267 listed firms on China’s 
domestic stock market exchange that adopted the state-mandated split-share structure reform; a 
quarter of these firms changed their stock names upon the adoption of the reform. Even though 
they choose to change names after a policy shock, we find that policy-related factors are not the 
drivers of name change. Instead, firms guilty by low performance or financial fraud in the recent 
past are more likely to engage in name change, suggesting that firms tend to repair image in the 
window of environmental change. We further analyze that due to the ambiguity of change time 
and the ambiguity of change rationale, firms are able to manipulate audiences’ perceptions by 
convincing them via name change that effective firm-level change is likely to be undertaken. To 
strengthen our theoretical argument, we distinguish three types of name change and undertake 
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both event study using the cumulative abnormal returns analysis and instrumented regressions to 
assess the short-term and long-term value implications of different types of name change 
strategies on the stock market. We find significant differences in the immediate market reaction 
to name change upon the policy adoption across 3 name change types: firms changing holding 
company experience significant negative market reaction at the time of implementing new stock 
names, whereas firms dropping region and changing product/industry do not. Importantly, we 
also find significant differences in the long-term market evaluation across 3 name change 
strategies: over a period of time, firms dropping region and changing product/industry in their 
stock names outperform firms adding holding company and firms that have not changed their 
names at all upon the policy shock. Overall, the immediate and long-term value implications of 
dropping a firm’s region and changing product/industry are significantly more positive than those 
of making change in the holding company name. 
Firms differ in name change strategies and subsequent performance outcomes, suggesting a 
variation in their ability to use symbolic management tactics to manage image in order to cope with 
change. Ironically, our results also show that though name change becomes effective in 
influencing audiences’ perceptions of the firms reflected in an increasing market evaluation in 
the long-run, actual firm performance does not improve. The contrast between market 
perceptions and actual profitability confirms our argument that firms are able to maneuver 
audiences’ impressions through name change by convincing them that effective firm-level 
change is likely to be undertaken.  
Our theoretical and empirical analyses make several contributions to the theory of image 
and symbolic management. First, we emphasize how institutional change provides firms with the 
opportunity of exploiting the ambiguity of change time and the ambiguity of change rationale to 
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manipulate audiences’ perceptions of the firms. In previous studies, institutional change has been 
described as generating new pressures and constraints that shape firms’ response strategies. 
There has been a surge in research focusing on the use of decoupling as a coping response for 
handling institutional complexity (Binder, 2007; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; George, 
Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Lok, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). 
Nevertheless, we seldom see studies exploring how dynamism in the institutional environment 
can also create opportunities at a particular point in time for firms to exercise strategic efforts 
that serve their purposes effectively. We still lack the theoretical language to talk about the value 
creation outcome of symbolic strategies in general for that matter. Our theoretical perspectives 
and empirical evidences shed some light on this issue by showing that how firms can take up the 
opportunity provided by institutional change and employ symbolic management techniques to 
marginalize or eliminate the tensions created by institutional transition as well as creating long-
term value for the firms.  
Second, our theoretical discussion on ambiguity of change time and ambiguity of change 
rationale provides a nuanced perspective to combine behavioral theory with institutional change 
and symbolic management literature. Ambiguity in the theory of decision making has not gained 
much attention in empirical research, yet it provides a sound logic for various firm behaviors. 
Image management cannot be effective if ultimate clarity is always emphasized in audiences’ 
sense-making and decision-making process. Our theoretical stand indicates a new direction for 
scholars interested in image management and symbolic actions to consider the psychological 
roots that support the employment of impression and the political nature of symbols.  
Third, this study shows empirically how name change can be at once symbolic and 
substantial. In using name change upon the adoption of new policy, firms link the environment 
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change to the description of a desired future strategic change, thus generating the anticipated 
congruence between their new image and assumptions about improved practices widely held 
within the financial community. This congruence enhances the aspiration of audiences by 
creating the perception of “a brighter future” that is self-reinforced by audiences who want to 
believe in firms’ realization of their desired objectives (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2002; 
Westphal and Graebner, 2010). To obtain an increasing positive perception from the market, the 
key is to frame future change and embrace it in the new name in aspirational terms (Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996), and to portray a credibly attractive future image that will trigger audiences to 
reevaluate, envision and believe in the strategic change. The value of such impression 
management may be especially high among firms guilty of low performance or frauds in the 
recent past since the investors and financial analysts have rendered relatively negative 
assessments of the firm’s performance already. By improving audiences’ assessment of a firm’s 
future, effective name change can increase the likelihood of having more optimistic earnings 
forecasts, thus attracting more investors to the firm. The market reaction analyses show that 
crucial audiences pay attention to the name change, and their construal of why firms change 
names offers a touchstone for shifting the market’s evaluation of the firms.  
Fourth, we find that firms use name change as a basis for attention mobilization, and some 
firms are able to select name change strategies on the basis of how well they communicate, 
reinforce, or repair image that can exercise effective impression management to enhance 
confidence in their future operations. Previous research suggests that impression management 
tactics are mostly effective when they speak to the motives or intentions of a focal actor, and not 
merely to the capabilities (Aerts, 2005; Wayne & Kacmar, 1991; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). 
Name change, implying a departure from the past, without articulating how much better the firms 
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will become, serves to persuade audiences to accept the message they attempt to convey, and 
thus becomes an ideal technique to shift attention to favorable attributions of firm change. Firms’ 
ability to mobilize attention is vividly illustrated by the empirical evidence here. For instance, the 
finding that only firms accused of being irresponsible during the financial disclosure process are 
likely to change names suggests that even though disassociating themselves from their 
dishonored past is the major motive for name change, firms are aware that only when the cause 
of fraud is unclear can they use name change to erase such memory, otherwise the motive of 
name change becomes too obvious, thus turns less effective.  
Fifth, the results indicate that ups and downs on the financial market ensue from the 
interplay between audience judgments and the active agency of listed firms that promote favored 
interpretations of their activities. Here, the choice of a new name can be seen as a reflection of 
the internal strategy for national expansion (dropping location) or a managerial commitment to 
successful integration and re-structuring of a firm’s corporate portfolio (dropping/adding 
specifics). Although audiences may be pluralistic in their construal of other aspects of an 
organization's identity (Glynn, 2000), with differing levels of exposure to organizations, they do 
not differ significantly in their understanding of organizational names or in their sensitivity to the 
symbolic conformity of those names (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). As a result, the market tends to 
price according to what it anticipates to happen so may not be able to properly price intangible 
assets such as firm name at the time a name change occurs, and tends to be overly optimistic 
about the prospects of a firm’s change over time. The long-term optimism towards name change 
and whether there is an overvaluation of certain types of names are research directions that 
deserve future exploration. 
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FIGURE 1:  
This figure shows the plotted mean of the cumulative abnormal returns since the starting date of a firm’s announcement of name change 
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FIGURE 2:  
This figure shows the plotted mean of the cumulative abnormal returns since the starting date of a firm’s announcement of name change across 
different types of name change 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Logit Model  𝒂 
 
 𝑎 A total of 1267 firms and 1267 firm-year observations comprise the data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean s. d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. (Name Change) 0.24 0.43 0 1                
2. Age 7.77 3.54 0.87 17.46 0.30               
3. Size 9.20 0.46 6.95 11.71 -0.13 0.01              
4.  Provincial 0.60 0.40 0 1 0.04 0.02 -0.17             
5.  Individual 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.10 -0.07 -0.30 0.27            
6. Change of Head 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.07 0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01           
7.  Ratio of Board’s Shareholding 0.24 0.30 0 1 -0.11 0.04 0.19 0.06 -0.01 -0.17          
8.  Number of M&As in Prior Year 0.80 1.03 0 6 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.05         
9.  Number of Name Changes by Peers 140.7 91.20 0 308 0.07 0.30 -0.21 -0.05 0.00 0.18 -0.16 -0.05        
10.  Nontradable shares conversion  0.23 0.22 0.11 0.84 -0.10 -0.30 -0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 0.02 -0.15       
11.  Decoupling 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.10 0.26 -0.13 0.06 0.12 0.13 -0.07 0.04 0.34 0.18      
12.  ROA 0.016 0.20 -2.75 2.57 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.13 0.03 -0.08     
13.  Tobin’s q 0.81 0.25 0.38 6.13 -0.02 0.07 -0.21 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.18 0.14 0.11 -0.13    
14.  False Financial Disclosure 
15.  Delay of Financial Disclosure  
 
16.  Irresponsibility in Disclosure Process 
0.07 
0.13 
0.04 
0.26 
0.34 
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0.07 
0.05 
0.01 
0.15 
0.26 
0.04 
-0.09 
-0.05 
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0.16 
0.23 
0.05 
-0.00 
-0.09 
0.02 
0.08 
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0.03 
 
0.33 
0.22 
 
 
0.24 
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TABLE 2: Results for Logit Model  𝐚 
     
 𝐚  𝐚     −   Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
     
Age 0.31**  (0.03) 0.31** (0.03) 0.31** (0.03) 0.32** (0.03) 
Size -0.85**(0.22) -0.84**(0.22) -0.96**(0.23) -0.98**(0.24) 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Region YES YES YES YES 
Provincial -0.05    (0.24) -0.06  (0.24) -0.05  (0.24) -0.07  (0.24) 
Individual 0.50* (0.20) 0.50* (0.20) 0.51* (0.20) 0.50* (0.20) 
Change of CEO/President 0.21     (0.18) 0.21   (0.18) 0.21   (0.18) 0.21   (0.18) 
Ratio of Board’s Shareholding -0.77*(0.34) -0.78* (0.34) -0.74* (0.34) -0.75* (0.35) 
Number of M&As in Prior Year 0.22**(0.08) 0.22**(0.08) 0.22**(0.08) 0.21**(0.08) 
Diversification level 0.01      (0.05) 0.01(0.05) 0.01(0.05) 0.01(0.05) 
Number of Name Changes by Peer Firms -0.00** (0.00) -0.00** (0.00) -0.00**(0.00) -0.00** (0.00) 
Nontradable shares conversion  -0.14     (0.40) -0.15  (0.40) 0.01  (0.41) 0.06  (0.42) 
Decoupling 0.19      (0.20) 0.17   (0.20) 0.19   (0.20) 0.18   (0.20) 
     
ROA  -0.57 (0.40) -0.93+ (0.53) -1.01+ (0.56) 
     
Tobin’s Q   -0.92* (0.41) -0.92* (0.41) 
     
False Financial Disclosure    0.18  (0.34) 
     
Delay of Financial Disclosure    -0.33  (0.29) 
     
Irresponsibility in Disclosure Process    0.78+ (0.42) 
     
Constant 4.63+ (2.63) 4.57+ (2.63) 6.28* (2.73) 6.43* (2.74) 
     
Observations 
Likelihood ratio (df) 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. Model 1 (df) 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. Model 2 (df) 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. Model 3 (df) 
 
1267 
292.64**(73) 
 
1267 
295.65**(74) 
3.01* (1) 
1267 
302.13**(75) 
9.49**(2) 
6.48**(1) 
1267    
308.15**(78) 
15.51**(5) 
12.50*(4) 
6.02+(3) 
 𝑎 A total of 1267 firms and 1267 firm-year observations comprise the data. Standard errors are in parentheses. Two sided t-tests for coefficients. 
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Summary of Conditions Prior to Name Change  
 
 Column 1 
All Firms 
N=1267 
Column 2 
Name Change 
N=310 
Column 3 
Drop Location 
N=133 
Column 4 
Drop/Add Specifics 
N=186 
Column 5 
Add Holding Company 
N=101 
ROA (mean) 
(std. dev.) 
0.016 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
 -0.004 
(0.17) 
 0.002 
(0.10) 
Tobin’s Q (mean) 
(std. dev.) 
0.81 
(0.25) 
0.80 
(0.15) 
0.78 
(0.10) 
0.81 
(0.17) 
0.82 
(0.15) 
False Financial Disclosure (count) 
(percentage) 
91 32 
(35.2%) 
12 
(13.2%) 
11 
(12.1%) 
9 
(9.9%) 
Delay of Financial Disclosure (count) 
(percentage) 
166 49 
(29.5%) 
17 
(10.2%) 
18 
(10.8%) 
14 
(8.4%) 
Irresponsibility in Disclosure Process 
(count) (percentage) 
47 28 
(59.6%) 
9 
(22.0%) 
11 
(23.4%) 
8 
(17.0%) 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Results for the Cumulative Abnormal Returns Analysis on Immediate Market Reactions 
 
 
 
 
Event Window 
Column 1 
All Name Change 
N=310 
No change: N=957 
Column 2 
Drop Location 
N=133 
No change: N=957 
Column 3 
Drop/Add Specifics 
N=186 
No change: N=957 
Column 4 
Add Holding Company 
N=101 
No change: N=957 
[-1;3]   Window  -1.69%* (0.0075) -0.80% (0.0101) -0.98% (0.0106) -2.47%* (0.0112) 
[-1;5]   Window  -1.89%* (0.0086) -0.71% (0.0115) -1.07% (0.0121) -2.60%* (0.0128) 
[-1;10] Window -2.12%* (0.0099) -0.26% (0.0133) -1.15% (0.0140) -2.89%+ (0.0148) 
[-10;1] Window -1.43%* (0.0066) -1.18% (0.0089) -0.75% (0.0094) -1.91%+ (0.0100) 
[-3;3]   Window -1.70%* (0.0075) -0.88% (0.0101) -1.00% (0.0106) -2.50%* (0.0112) 
[-5;5]   Window -1.94%* (0.0086) -1.10% (0.0116) -1.04% (0.0122) -2.49%+ (0.0129) 
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TABLE 5: Results for the Instrumented OLS Regressions on Tobin’s q 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
VARIABLES All name change Drop location Drop/Add specifics Add holding company 
     
Age -0.01 (0.01) -0.01+(0.00) -0.01+(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
Size 0.06**(0.02) 0.05**(0.01) 0.05**(0.02) 0.05**(0.02) 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Region YES YES YES YES 
Provincial -0.03*(0.01) -0.03*(0.01) -0.03*(0.01) -0.03*(0.01) 
Individual 0.04**(0.01) 0.04**(0.01) 0.04**(0.01) 0.04**(0.02) 
Change of Head -0.00(0.01) -0.00(0.01) -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) 
Number of M&As in Prior Year -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) 
Change in diversification level -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) 
Nontradable shares conversion 0.01(0.022) 0.01(0.02) 0.01(0.02) 0.01(0.02) 
Decoupling -0.02+(0.01) -0.02(0.01) -0.02(0.01) -0.02+(0.01) 
False Financial Disclosure -0.04*(0.02) -0.04*(0.02) -0.04+(0.02) -0.04+(0.02) 
Delay of Financial Disclosure 0.00(0.02) 0.00(0.02) -0.00(0.02) -0.00(0.02) 
Irresponsibility in Disclosure Process 0.03(0.03) 0.05+(0.03) 0.04(0.03) 0.04(0.03) 
ROA in previous year -0.04(0.02) -0.05*(0.02) -0.05*(0.02) -0.05+(0.03) 
     
Dependent Variables:     
𝐓𝐨  𝐧’  𝐪𝐭 − 𝐓𝐨  𝐧
′  𝐪𝐭−      
Name change type 𝑏 0.14(0.15) 0.11(0.13) 0.12(0.14) 0.04(0.24) 
     
Alternative Dependent Variables 𝒄:     
𝐓𝐨  𝐧’  𝐪𝐭+ − 𝐓𝐨  𝐧
′  𝐪𝐭     
Name change type 𝑏 0.70*(0.35) 0.33+(0.18) 0.56+(0.31) -0.79(0.61) 
     
𝐓𝐨  𝐧’  𝐪𝐭+𝟐 − 𝐓𝐨  𝐧
′  𝐪𝐭+      
Name change type 𝑏 1.21*(0.56) 0.72**(0.35) 0.90*(0.40) -0.70(0.88) 
     
 𝑏 The independent variable name change type includes: All name change, Drop location, Drop/Add specifics, and Add holding company.  
The regression results for each name change type under 3 alternative dependent variables are presented in different columns.  
 𝑐 Results for the full regressions are available from the authors. 
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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TABLE 6: Results for the Instrumented OLS regressions on ROA 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
VARIABLES All name change Drop location Drop/Add specifics Add holding company 
Age 0.00(0.01) -0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) -0.00(0.01) 
Size -0.04(0.04) -0.01(0.02) -0.02(0.03) -0.01(0.03) 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Region YES YES YES YES 
Provincial -0.01(0.02) -0.01(0.02) -0.01(0.02) -0.01(0.02) 
Individual 0.01(0.03) 0.00(0.02) 0.01(0.02) -0.00(0.03) 
Change of Head 0.04*(0.02) 0.03*(0.02) 0.03*(0.02) 0.03*(0.02) 
Number of M&As in Prior Year 0.02+(0.01) 0.01+(0.01) 0.02+(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 
Change in diversification level -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) 
Nontradable shares conversion -0.09*(0.04) -0.10**(0.04) -0.10*(0.04) -0.09**(0.04) 
Decoupling -0.01(0.02) -0.02(0.02) -0.01(0.02) -0.01(0.02) 
False Financial Disclosure -0.05(0.04) -0.05(0.03) -0.06+(0.03) -0.06+(0.03) 
Delay of Financial Disclosure -0.02(0.03) -0.02(0.03) -0.02(0.03) -0.01(0.03) 
Irresponsibility in Disclosure Process 0.01(0.05) -0.01(0.04) 0.00(0.05) -0.02(0.05) 
Tobin’s q in previous year 0.26**(0.04) 0.28**(0.03) 0.28**(0.03) 0.29**(0.03) 
     
Dependent Variables:     
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭 − 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭−      
Name change type 𝑏 
 
-0.11(0.26) -0.05(0.21) -0.08(0.22) -0.10(0.37) 
Alternative Dependent Variables  𝒄:     
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭+ − 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭     
Name change type 𝑏 -0.13(0.20) -0.11(0.17) -0.13(0.19) -0.02(0.29) 
     
𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭+𝟐 − 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭+      
Name change type 𝑏 -0.71*(0.36) -0.62*(0.28) -0.64*(0.29) -0.51(0.58) 
     
 𝑏 The independent variable name change type includes: All name change, Drop location, Drop/Add specifics, and Add holding company.  
The regression results for each name change type under 3 alternative dependent variables are presented in different columns.  
 𝑐 Results for the full regressions are available from the authors. 
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
